A History of Indecision

...and What Labour Can Learn From It

The current Labour government has often been described as pandering too far to both to the left and right; either as a party with no backbone and no committed political vision, or a pragmatic, technocratic party aiming to win a broad range of voters.

So far, the former has been the case. Labour seems stranded on an island of ideological indecision, suffocated by the Green’s and Reform; parties with more strongly defined identities. This is not just a trap that Starmer has fallen into, as leaders and regimes throughout history have attempted similar strategies of political appeasement. Whilst this has often led to disaster, it has just as often led to stability and cohesion.

So, with this being said, what are some examples of this phenomenon and what can Starmer’s Labour learn from a history of political indecision?

One of the most infamous examples of attempted crowd-pleasing policy is found in Mikhail Gorbachev; the eighth and final leader of the Soviet Union. Whilst the USSR’s collapse may have been inevitable, Gorbachev’s attempts to pander to both Soviet hardliners and pro-democracy reformers undeniably catalysed its breakup. He was simultaneously too progressive and not progressive enough, lacking the resolution to hold his struggling superpower together.

However, Gorbachev’s indecisive policy does not exist in isolation. The Second Spanish Republic tried to please both its nationalist and revolutionary population, but ultimately pleased neither, leading to the brutal Spanish civil war and the ascension of Francisco Franco as dictator in 1939.

The French Second Republic of 1848 promised a new democratic state of France, but its attempts to balance the demands of the working class and bourgeoisie failed, contributing to Louise Napoleon-Bonaparte seizing power and becoming emperor in 1852.

Looking closer to home, 17th century England’s attempts to balance the demands of puritanism, anglicanism, and presbyterianism supported Cromwell’s transition from military commander to effective dictator in 1653.

Whilst these examples are extreme, they represent a few of many instances where political appeasement and indistinctive ideology have led to unrest, instability, and extremism. However, for each of these damning cases, there exists mirror cases where adept political actors are able to employ middle-way policies to great success. 

Following the great depression, Franklin D. Roosevelt managed to balance the vastly differing demands of the working and business classes through his ‘New Deal’; securing stability, unity, and prosperity. He ended up serving the longest tenure in American history and ultimately laid the foundations for the USA’s current hegemony. Similarly, Elizabeth I of England emerged as Queen into an England existentially divided on religious lines, but whose moderate and accommodating policies secured profound stability. This triggered what is widely considered to be the ‘golden age’ of English history. Furthermore, following the Second World War, Ludwig Erhard steered West-Germany into a period of stability and prosperity during his Chancellery between 1963 and 1966. He implemented the ‘social market economy’, which balanced free-market capitalism with social welfare, pleasing all sides of the political spectrum. 

Therefore, it does seem that Labour’s widely criticised ideological indistinction is not entirely unfounded. Furthermore, it is crucial to identify that this policy is most often pursued following a period of significant unrest. Whether it be the product of economic difficulty, violent conflict, or ideological division, the ‘middle-way’ is often perceived as the antidote to instability.

It seems likely that Starmer identified a Britain crippled by Brexit, Covid, and political division, and looked towards indistinction for stability, unity, and prosperity. However, Starmer is currently far more Gorbachev than Roosevelt in this pursuit. So, how did he get it so wrong when others got it so right, and what can he learn?

First, Labour must define a ‘Starmerism’ that is as distinct as Erhard’s Social Market Economy, and ensure that this identity comes from a position of leadership, not reaction. One of Gorbachev’s mistakes was to define himself by what he was reforming away from rather than what he was building towards.

Conversely, figures like Roosevelt did not merely react to their populations' varying demands, but performed a synthesis of them. He created an entirely new political identity born from the identities that preceded him. Starmer successfully came to power through a rejection of Conservatism and Corbynist Labour, and so far appears to be reacting to issues as they arise.

However, this is no political identity or strategy to run a country on. To succeed, Starmer must form a political identity that makes divides in political ideology feel obsolete, not merely ignored, and push policies that clearly coincide with that identity. Success of middle-way policy comes from redefining the centre, whilst failure comes from merely occupying it. 

Secondly, and perhaps most problematically, the Labour government must deliver tangible economic prosperity. The legitimacy and success of ideologically indistinct regimes is inseparable with economic success. FDR’s ‘New Deal’ was so successful because it improved the economy and put people back to work.

Without the public feeling any improvement in their pockets, Starmer’s ideological indecision will be seen as the problem not the solution. He is exposed to attacks from both the left and right without a safe base, and is ultimately setting himself up for failure without concrete results. 

Third of all, total consensus is both dangerous and impossible. When a middle-way government appears weak or indecisive, such as those that preceded Louise Napoleon-Bonaparte or Cromwell, extremism takes hold. Labour must find specific, high-profile battles to prove it is more than a people pleaser, and demonstrate that it is willing to alienate certain groups in favour of a core vision.

Whilst it is important for Starmer to control the fringes, he must not confuse this with pandering to them. Elizabeth I did not succeed by pandering to the Puritans and Catholics, she succeeded by forming a state that functioned regardless of their approval. Much is the same for Starmer’s success. He should not be aiming to please the political fringes, but to build a broad majority that views the extremes as irrelevant to the running of the country

Ultimately, ideological indecision is both a tool and a trap that has permeated political regimes throughout history. Whilst often used to great success, it has just as often resulted in the fall of political systems and ascension of autocracy. Therefore, the line that Starmer currently walks is a fine one.

To succeed he must learn from both the successes and failures of past proprietors of the middle-way. However, as it stands he seems to be spiralling into a state of instability and disillusionment; rejected by all sides of the political spectrum and left in a no man's land with no base to prop him up.