The Cost of Caution

What More Should be Done to Combat Chinese Espionage in the UK?

 The United Kingdom’s relationship with China has always been marked by ups and downs. However, Britain is currently treating China like a difficult trading partner, not a national security threat. They are currently the UK’s fifth largest trading partner, with successive governments seeking better relations. Yet lingering in the background is growing intrusions by China into the affairs of the British government. Policy responses directed at increasingly frequent Chinese incursions have been lacklustre. If the UK wants to protect its institutions, it must no longer tinker at the margins and adopt an effective, targeted policy to counter Chinese espionage.

The last 5 years have seen growing efforts by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to gain access to sensitive information in the UK through a variety of methods.

Most notably, two British men, Christopher Cash, a parliamentary researcher, and Christopher Berry, a teacher in China, were accused of passing on information to Chinese officials in 2025. The case was dropped before going to trial, with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) declaring that evidential standards were not met. The CPS confirmed that to prove espionage under the 1911 Official Secrets Act, the country receiving information must be deemed an ‘enemy of the UK’. Specifically this a nation that poses ‘a national security threat’, which China was not legally considered. The prosecution concluded the case could not succeed, so charges were dropped, and no conviction was secured. This outcome is consistent with previous cases, where prosecutors have struggled with ambiguous definitions and high burdens of proof. The concept of enemy as stated in the 1911 Act reflects a wartime environment, so does not account for the new ways that hostile countries can pose a threat. Hence the outdated and unclear framework with which the case against Cash and Berry was undertaken contributed to the inability of the courts to secure a trial.

The frequency of cyber-attacks by groups with ties to the Chinese government has also increased. In 2021, the government was reportedly the victim of an attack by APT31 and Storm 1849 in 2025, both cyber-hacking groups with links to the CCP. Furthermore, In November 2025 Security Minister Dan Jarvis warned MPs they were being targeted by Chinese spies. MPs were being contacted by accounts on LinkedIn, that were aiming to extract information on government operations. These cases emphasise the need for a specific policy that accounts for China’s particularly versatile approach to intelligence gathering.

Increasing instances of Chinese espionage come amidst the decision made on the 20^th of January to approve controversial plans for a new Chinese mega embassy in central London. Concerns have been raised that the new embassy could pose security risks, especially as the site, located in Royal Mint Court, is in close proximity to fibre optic cables carrying sensitive information to the City. A government spokesperson has confirmed that intelligence agencies oversaw the embassy’s planning, and concentrating China’s diplomatic premises in one location would bring ‘clear security advantages’. Also, Shabana Mahmood, the UK’s Home Secretary, had to reassure the media that blacked-out rooms in the building’s blueprint were not suspicious. Starmer’s decision to greenlight the embassy could signal the direction Anglo-Sino relations are heading. The decision has seen significant opposition, such as from nine Labour MPs, with worries that an increased Chinese presence could pose a threat to national security. Nonetheless, Starmer has opted for conserving diplomatic ties with an important economic partner, with a visit to China due early this year.

The UK is not the only Western nation facing threats to their security from China. The US, Czechia and Germany are among nations that have reported instances of Chinese espionage. This suggests that the West should take a joint approach to fighting interference by China. Although, the US released the CSA in conjunction with other Western nations which outlines China as a security threat, it lacks meaningful policy. All Western nations are threatened by Chinese espionage, so should work collaboratively to fight it through a comprehensive joint policy.

Successive UK governments have not been effective in their response to Chinese espionage either. In May 2024, Anne Keast-Butler, Director of GCHQ (the UK’s intelligence, security and cyber agency), said “we now devote more resource to China than any other single mission”, and that “China poses a genuine and increasing cyber risk to the UK”. However, it is arguable that this intent has not translated to effective policy.

The previous Conservative government brought in a few policies to reduce the risk of Chinese espionage since 2020, but these have either been on a small-scale or ineffective. In 2021, government introduced policies targeting the Chinese tech company Huawei and established new powers for the government to investigate and intervene in mergers, acquisitions and other deals that could threaten the UK’s stability. These policies were not comprehensive enough to combat China’s dynamic intelligence gathering methods.

The Tories most meaningful counter-intelligence policy was The 2023 National Security Act, which replaced the aforementioned 1911 Official Secrets Act. This saw the establishment of the Foreign Interference Registration Scheme (FIRS). After the introduction of the scheme, individuals who engage with a foreign power must register with FIRS if there is potential for political implications. This broadens the scope with which engagements with other countries are examined and accounts for modern espionage realities. However, this policy is still underwhelming with respect to China’s especial threat. FIRS has two tiers, ‘political influence’ tier and an ‘enhanced tier’. China currently remains in the lower political influence tier, but there are growing calls for it to be designated in the enhanced tier, alongside Russia and Iran. By moving China up, the scope of investigation into Chinese operations in the UK would be increased and the chances of catching illegal activities would improve but elevating China to this tier would carry significant diplomatic implications.

The incumbent Labour government have also not made clear their stance on China. In the government’s June 2025 National Security Strategy, it said that “instances of China’s espionage, interference in our democracy and the undermining of our economic security have increased in recent years”. As such, “our national security response will therefore continue to be threat-driven, bolstering our defences and responding with strong countermeasures”. On China, the strategy also said that “We will seek a trade and investment relationship that supports secure and resilient growth and boosts the UK economy”. This has also largely been the narrative pushed by Starmer himself as he attempts to balance China’s economic importance and security threat.

Jarvis has announced that he will be coordinating a new Counter Political Interference and Espionage Action Plan to disrupt and deter spying from states like China. The plan will see the intelligence services deliver security briefings for political parties and advise election candidates so that they are better equipped to deal with suspicious activity. Furthermore, £170 million is to be invested in sovereign and encrypted technology used by civil servants and £130 million to fund the National Cyber Security Centre’s and National Protective Security Authority’s work. This plan does represent awareness of potential threats to British institutional integrity, its measures are arguably not suited to China’s approach to espionage, which expands beyond traditional or cyber-focused methods. The plan prioritises raising awareness and consolidating existing anti-espionage procedures. Instead, a fundamental reshaping of the current system should be undertaken which attacks the issue head-on. The defensive structure in place now reflects the economic constraints of challenging China directly, but the government needs to put UK security first at a time of rising geopolitical tensions.

Starmer should first designate China a national security threat as over the past 5 years there is considerable evidence to prove that China has operated illegally in the UK political system on numerous occasions. Upgrading China to the enhanced tier of the FIRS scheme is an essential step in increasing the surveillance Chinese activity receives. Next the British government should work with Western allies to develop a joint digital infrastructure to perceive and deal with Chinese cyber threats. As government operations become increasingly digitalised, it is vital that there is sufficient obstacles to Chinese hacking. Finally, the new Chinese embassy should receive extensive surveillance in both its construction and operations once it is built to ensure that British intelligence is secure.

Better relations with China should be fostered, especially in the case of greater trade links, but absolutely not at the cost of national security. Expanding intelligence gathering efforts by China should be responded to with great seriousness. There should be investment in a comprehensive, modern, anti-espionage framework to deal with China, who should be designated a significant threat to Britain.